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Davis: Larceny by Trick Statute

CONSUMER PROTECTION VIA THE
LARCENY BY TRICK STATUTE
N 1951, IN THE DECISION of State v. Healy,' the Ohio Supreme Court
2
examined and interpreted the so-called larceny by trick statute. The
significance of that decision in terms of consumer protection for Ohio
is immense, though as yet unfelt because of a disinclination on the part
of public officials and the legal community to use criminal statutes for
such a purpose.
The belief that criminal statutes are not the proper vehicle for
carrying forward an effective plan for the protection of the consumer
is widespread. A recent study of the direct selling industry stated with
regard to fraudulent practices:
Criminal convictions are difficult to obtain and are an ineffective
way to regulate consumer fraud. Enforcement agencies do not have
enough time and manpower to devote to criminal fraud cases; the
time spent is less likely to result in conviction. If someone is con-3
victed the penalty will probably be too small to act as a deterrent.
The former Attorney General, now the senior senator from Ohio,
the Hon. William B. Saxbe, conducted an in-depth study of the role of
government in consumer protection and stated that:
The criminal law is not an appropriate tool to achieve broad social
policy goals. It necessitates proof of the impossible requirements of
scienter, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, penalties and fines that
strict construction
may be deemed only a cost of doing business, and
4
and application of statutes by judges and juries.
A more recent statement from the Ohio Office of the Attorney
General espoused a similar sentiment, saying:
It has long been the contention of those active in consumer
protection that criminal statutes have not been an effective weapon

I State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 102 N.E.2d 233 (1951).
2 OHIo REV. CoDE § 2907.21 (Supp. 1972), providing that:
No person shall obtain possession of or title to, anything of value with the
consent of the person from whom he obtained it, provided he induced such
consent by a false or fraudulent representation, pretense, token, or writing.
Whoever violates this section is guilty of larceny by trick, and, if the
value of the service or thing so obtained or sought to be obtained is sixty
dollars or more, shall be imprisoned not less than one nor more than seven
years. If the value is less than sixty dollars, such person shall be fined not more
than three hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than ninety days, or both.
3 Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.LA. L. REv.
883, 955 n. 308 (1969).
4 Saxbe, The Role of the Government in Consumer Protection: The Consumer Frauds
and Crimes Section of the Ohio Attorney General, 29 Ohmo L. REv. 897, 908 (1968).
[215]
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against deceptive and fraudulent selling practices. This view is
supported by a letter survey of county prosecutors recently conducted
by the Consumer Frauds and Crime Section. 5
An examination of the history and scope of the larceny by trick
statute, the broad language of decisions interpreting said statute, and
pertinent legal, social, and economic factors shows this aversion to act
on the part of public officials to be unwarranted.
For the most part, consumer protection in Ohio has been the work
of such agencies as the Better Business Bureau, legal aid societies, the
Chamber of Commerce, and private consumer organizations.' In Ohio,
the only state agency concerned with the general area of consumer frauds
and deception is the administratively created Consumer Frauds and
Crimes Section of the Attorney General's office. 7 The main function of
this agency is gathering information and educating the public and other
public officials and not enforcing criminal statutes. 8 It was recently
noted that "there is no active or well-financed network of consumer
related organizations in Ohio." 9
It is of course possible for the defrauded consumer to bring a civil
action for fraud if there is an intentional misrepresentation by the
vendor;' 0 or if the misrepresentation is innocent or is the result of
nondisclosure, the victim may institute an action for constructive fraud.u
However, unless the loss to the consumer is substantial, the cost-benefit
ratio of such civil actions makes them impractical.
It is the purpose of this comment to demonstrate that the means for
practical and effective consumer protection in the area of consumer
frauds does in fact exist in Ohio in the form of a criminal statute-the
larceny by trick statute, and this means could be utilized by local
prosecutors. Similar statutes exist in most states under the heading of
larceny by trick or false pretenses. Depending on the language of the
statutes of the other jurisdictions, many of the principles discussed herein
in connection with the Ohio statute may be applicable to those statutes.

5 CONSUMER FRAUDS & CRIMES BULLETIN, June, 1971, at 1 [hereinafter cited as
BULLETIN].
6 Omo LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, REPORT No. 103, CONSUMER LAws,
PROGRAMS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 23 (1971) [hereinafter cited as REPORT No. 103].
7Id. at 27.
8 CONSUMER FRAUDS & CRIMES BULLETIN, July, 1963.

9 REPORT No. 103 at 23.
10 Manning v. Len Inmke Buick, 28 Ohio App.2d 203, 276 N.E.2d 253 (1971).
n Ruedy v. Toledo Factories Co., 61 Ohio App. 21, 23 N.E.2d 293 (1939).
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HISTORY AND PURPOSE
Under the general larceny statute, 12 it was not larceny for a person
to take and carry away the property of another if the owner of said
property voluntarily delivered the property to the taker with the intent that
the taker was to have not only possession of the property, but also title
to the property. This was true even though fraud was practiced to induce
the delivery of the property. The fraudulent taker is considered to have
taken and carried away his own property, not the property of another."
To deal with the fraudulent taker, a statute was passed designating
actions of obtaining property by false pretenses to be criminal. 14 The false
pretenses statute is concerned with fraudulent acts to obtain possession of
another's property. This statute was supplemented by the larceny by trick
statute 15 to make it a crime to obtain possession of or title to the property
of another by a false or fraudulent representation.
The effectiveness of the false pretenses statute was severely limited
by the Ohio Supreme Court in its decision in Harris v. State. 6 It
construed the statute to apply only to a representation that related to
17
a past or present fact or event and not to a promise relating to the future.
The larceny by trick statute has not suffered from such a limitation.
In 1949, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, examined the
statute in the case of State v. Singleton.'8 The court stated, "As is
commonly known, many swindles are perpetrated by inducing the owner
to part with the possession or title to his property by means of false or
fraudulent representations as to future events of transactions .... 19 The
court then went on to say that it was apparent that the larceny by trick
statute was passed to fill in the gaps of the larceny and the false
pretenses statutes and to make it a criminal offense to perpetrate a
20
swindle by such means.
Another important aspect of the Singleton decision held
[Alny representation, pretense, token or writing, made by the actor
in furtherance of a scheme or artifice to defraud [emphasis added]
is a fraudulent representation, pretense, token or writing, and may,

12 Omo REv. CODE 1 2907.20.
Is Kellogg v. State, 26 Ohio St. 15 (1874).
14Omo REv. CoDE §2911.01.
15 Omo REV. CODE §2907.21 (Supp. 1972).
16
Harris v. State, 125 Ohio St. 257, 181 N.E. 104 (1932).
17 Id. at 259, 181 N.E. at 105.
18 State v. Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245, 87 N.E.2d 359 (1949).
19 Id. at 256, 87 N.E.2d at 365.
20 Id.
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depending on the specific character thereof, be both false and
fraudulent ....21
These two elements, a scheme to defraud and fraudulent representations that may be promissory in nature and relate to future facts or events
are important aspects for effecting consumer protection by section 2907.21.
SCOPE AND APPLICATION
That section 2907.21 is to have a broad scope was further delineated
22
by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Healy.
The defendant therein contended that his conviction by the trial
court could not stand since the trial court did not instruct the jury as to
specific intent being a requisite element of the crime. The Court of
Appeals agreed with the defendant and set aside the defendant's conviction
saying that the larceny by trick statute must be construed together with
the general larceny statute. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since
specific intent had been interpreted by the courts to be an element of the
crime of larceny (even though not so stated in the General Code), then
a similar interpretation should be given to the larceny by trick statute.23
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the larceny by trick statute
does not use the word "steal" but instead uses the word "obtain."24 The
court held that the word "obtain" "means just what it says, to get, to
secure possession of. It is used in the ordinary sense and has no technical
meaning beyond that."2
The court then stated:
It seems clear that where a statute in defining an offense is silent
on the question of intent and thereby indicates the purpose of
the General Assembly to make proof of a specific intent unnecessary,
proof of a general intent to do the proscribed act is sufficient .... 26
In a direct statement as to the scope of the statute the court stated,
"It is intended to be broader than the larceny statute... and to provide
that the commission of the fraudulent acts, coupled with obtaining of
possession or title to the property is sufficient to constitute an offense." 27
Later the court remarked that it ".... was clearly designed and enacted
for the purpose of protecting the innocent from ingenuous fraudulent

Id. at 257, 87 N.E.2d at 365.
State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229, 102 N.E.2d 233 (1951).
23 Id. at 238, 102 N.E.2d at 238.
21
22

24 Id.

25 Id. at 239, 102 N.E.2d at 238.

Id. at 239, 102 N.E.2d at 239.
2Id.
26
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schemes, and that purpose should not be thwarted by an interpretation
which would in effect nullify its very salutory provisions." 2 8
In interpreting the larceny by trick statute, the Court of Appeals in
Singleton noted that the fraudulent conduct proscribed by the statute was
"similar to the fraudulent conduct proscribed by Section 215 of the
29
United States Criminal Code (Section 338, Title 18, U.S. Code),"
(prohibiting mail fraud), and that:
[I]t is obvious that the fraudulent conduct proscribed in each of such
sections is of the same general character, and that the decisions
applicable to the interpretation and construction of Section 215 of
the United States Criminal Code are therefore applicable to the
interpretation of and construction of Section3012447-1, General Code
[now Section 29701.21, Ohio Revised Code].
Thus, under such decisions it has been held that the crime consists in
the making of those promises which the parties never intended to
perform, or false representations which they never intended to make
good, 3 ' and that when it is shown that a defendant knew he would not
perform a promissory representation, a fraud has been established. 32 In
commenting on how the intent may be established the Supreme Court held:
"The relevant representations were promissory, and substantial fraud
depended on the divergence between the promised performance and the
promisor's belief that he could perform." 33 Thus a great divergence
between promises and performance would be interpreted as intent to
defraud, and if such promises were made to a number of people a scheme
to defraud could be demonstrated.
The cases point to the conclusion that the essence of the crime is
the making false or fraudulent representations that induce another
to consent to part with possession of, or title to a thing of value. When
possession of, or title to a thing of value is transferred, based upon the
false or fraudulent representation, the offense is completed.
The value of the statute with respect to consumer protection is
further revealed in decisions that have struck down, as not applicable,
defenses which may prevail in a civil action based on fraud.
One typical deceptive trade practice is to make a number of
representations to the prospective purchaser regarding quality, value,
service, etc., and then have the customer sign a contract which excludes

Id. at 240, 102 N.E.2d at 239.
2985 Ohio App. at 257, 87 N.E.2d at 365.
28

30

Id. at 258, 87 N.E.2d at 366.

31

Barnard v. United States, 16 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1926).

32 Knickerbocker

Merchandising Co. v. United States, 13 F.2d 544 (2nd Cir. 1926).

Id. at 545.
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mention of these representations and contains a provision merging prior
oral representations into the subsequently executed written contract. The
promisor would then be able to produce the contract if any disagreement
arose as to the agreed bargain. In a civil action the defense is valid4 but
in criminal actions based on charges of false pretenses or larceny by
trick, the courts have not accepted the common law concept of
"merger" as a valid defense.
5
Thus, in the case of People v. Frankfort,3
the defendants were
charged with grand theft by obtaining money by false pretenses. The
defendants asserted that the contracts insulated them from prosecution
because they contained a merger clause and statements that no salesman
was authorized to make any statements other than those in the contract
and the defendants would not be held liable for any other representations.
The defendants claimed that since each party had read and understood
what he signed there could be no prosecution for false pretenses. The
court denied the defense reasoning that, since the state is not a party to
the contract it is not precluded by the contract language from prosecuting
a crime committed by way of the contract.36

Similar reasoning was used as long ago as 1888 in a decision in the
Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Jackson v. People.37 The
defendant who had misrepresented the health and quality of a horse sold
to one Hines, claimed he was absolved on the basis of a contract he
signed with Hines that had a merger clause. The court held that the
State was not precluded by the parol evidence rule from showing the true
state of facts in a criminal action.38 1
In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court of Washington reached
a similar result in State v. Cooke,39 but based its decision on a somewhat
different principle. There the court held that, "although 'a merger clause'
may bar one from asserting false oral representations in an action on a
written contract entered into at arm's length, it does not prevent the State
4
from enforcing a statute enacted for the public's protection."'
Another defense that may be effective in civil suits for a deceptive
sales practice is the claim that since the plaintiff received something of
value and cannot prove it is worth less than the price paid, there can

34

McCartney v. Roberts, 2 O.L.A. 139 (Ohio App. 1923).

People v. Frankfort, 114 Cal. App.2d 680, 251 P.2d 401 (1952).
381d.
3

37

Jackson v. People, 126 Ill.
139, 18 N.E. 286 (1888).

38 Id.
39 State v. Cooke, 59 Wash.2d 829, 371 P.2d 39 (1962).
40 Id.
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be no complaint at a later stage when the purchaser becomes dissatisfied
with the product, since there was no actual loss. 4'
In ruling on such an assertion in the case of People v. Ross,42 the
Court of Appeals of California stated, "Nor does the 'actual loss,' as
the defendant asserts, determine the existence of theft or the degree
thereof. 'If the victim is induced to part with money or property in
exchange for other property fraudulently misrepresented, the crime is
committed.'..
Examination of Section 2907.21 and decisions interpreting it have
thus established a number of factors that may make the statute useful as
a basis for consumer protection. The statute applies to those making false
representations that may be promissory in nature, may apply to representations of future events and transactions as well as to present or past
facts, and may be shown by demonstrating a scheme to defraud by the
promisor. The scheme itself may be shown by evidence of a wide
divergence in what the promisor said he would do and what his intentions
were, as demonstrated by his actions. The state is not required to show
specific intent, only a general intent, and the statute is not to be so strictly
construed as to deprive it of a useful purpose. In addition, the defense of
a merger clause in the written contract that denies any other representations were made is not effective in a criminal action. Nor is the fact that
the purchaser has suffered no net financial loss a valid defense since the
essence of the crime is making false or fraudulent representations that
induce another to transfer a thing of value and not the fact that the
purchaser has suffered financial loss.
Under the broad interpretations of Section 2907.21 in the Singleton
and Healy decisions, and by the decisions in other state and federal courts
of similar statutes, the scope of the statute is broad enough to include a
prohibition against the practice of making false or fraudulent statements
during preliminary negotiations or advertisements that are made to induce
a buyer to enter into a contract where such false representations are not
included, and where the maker of said false representations knew they
would not be included and, in fact, had no intention of carrying out said
false representations when they were made.
Thus, if a vendor states that the car he is selling has only 20,000
miles, or states that the vendee has three days to cancel the deal, or terms
the agreement "lay away," and the vendor makes these statements

4

lManning v. Len Inumke Buick, 28 Ohio App.2d 203, 205, 276 N.E.2d 253, 255

(1971).

42

People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App.3d 190, 100 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1972).

43

Id. at 195, 100 Cal. Rptr.at 705.
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knowing either they are not true or with no intention of carrying them
out, but solely for the purpose of inducing the vendee to transfer to him
a thing of value, then a "false or fraudulent representation pretense,
would have been made as proscribed by section
token or writing"
or artifice, the vendor does induce the vendee
scheme
this
by
If
2907.21.
to transfer to the vendor a thing of value, the crime stated in section
2907.21 is completed.
The provisions of this statute could be applied to a number of
deceptive practices that now plague the consumer. Magazine salesmen
who purport to be offering "special rates" but in fact are not, car dealers
who misrepresent used cars by turning back the odometer, stores that
advertise low prices to be the result of a "close out" but actually are
selling cheaper merchandise, or repairmen who misrepresent the condition
and need for repairs of an appliance or automobile could all be
prosecuted under this statute.
The penalties for violation of the statute are not to be regarded
lightly. In any such transaction involving sixty dollars or more a felony
is committed and the guilty party "shall be imprisoned not less than one
This can hardly be written off as an
nor more than seven years."
expense of doing business.
As was stated in a recent issue of Consumer Frauds and Crime
Bulletin, "[T]he apparent lack of criminal prosecutions in the consumer
frauds area cannot be attributed to the absence of an applicable statute."4
From the standpoint of legal arguments, section 2907.21 appears to be
an effective tool that could be utilized by local prosecutors to protect
the consumer.
EXTRA-LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
The first major hurdle to be overcome in instigating effective use of
the criminal laws for protection of consumers against fraudulent practices
is getting local and county prosecutors to recognize the scope of the
problem and the availability of remedies.
The Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Ohio Attorney
General's Office, "... the agency which has the best opportunity to
observe a broad range of fraudulent activities statewide, has estimated
that Ohioans lose $300 million annually from this cause-about $125 for
each family unit." 47 Not many types of criminal activity have such a

44
45
4

Omo
Id.

REv. CODE § 2907.21

(Supp. 1972).

6 BULLETIN at 2.

4

7 OFno LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, REPORT No.
OTHER ABUSES IN CONSUMER SALES AND SERVICE 1

102, FRAUD, DEcEPON, AND
(1971) [hereinafter cited as

REPORT No. 102].
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widespread effect on the public. Yet, in a 1970 survey of local public and
private organizations dealing with consumer protection in Ohio,1
the forty-five (out of the eighty-nine) county prosecutors' offices that
responded averaged only 11.6 man-hours per week per agency spent on
49
consumer problems. The fact that sixty-eight per cent of these county
prosecutors felt their staffs were of adequate size to deal with consumer
problems 5° is some evidence of a lack of recognition of the need for
action on the part of those who enforce the criminal statutes. It would
appear that the situation has not significantly changed since the survey. In
a November, 1972, article on the Consumer Affairs Division of the
5l
Summit County Prosecutor's Office it was stated that the division was
"one of the first on the local level and is believed to be one of the few
[offices] using the unique method of applying long-standing State criminal
52
laws on larceny by trick and fraud against unscrupulous businessmen."
In another survey of county prosecutors in Ohio,53 two reasons often
given for lack of enforcement in this area were the need for investigative
54
personnel and the overwhelming press of other criminal matters. It would
seem however, that the need for investigative personnel could often be
satisfied by using part-time and voluntary workers. Students and retirees
are good potential sources of willing and capable workers to search
records, conduct interviews, and to receive and check out complaints.
The magnitude of the problem has been previously indicated,55 and
this factor should be carefully weighed by local officials in deciding how
to allocate their time and resources. Although cost-benefit ratios displayed
by programs now in existence vary according to location, "the more
to consumers far exceed the
modest estimates of direct ' 5benefits
6
administrative costs involved."

48 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION,
AND PROTECTION (1971).

REPORT

No. 101,

CONSUMER PROBLEMS

49 Id. at 1, 407 organizations were surveyed with 72% responding.
501d. at 3.

51 Akron Beacon Journal, Nov. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
52 Id. at Al5.
53 BULLETIN at 2.

54 Id.
55 See REPORT No. 102.
56 THE COUNCIL

(1970).

OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
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CONCLUSION
The need for protection of the consumer against deceptive and
fraudulent practices cannot be doubted." Indeed, since the first state
program for consumer protection was established in New York in 1951,
most of the states have enacted some kind of consumer legislation or
are studying the consumer problem.5 8 The emphasis has been on
administrative agencies and procedures for civil action whereby the
victimized consumer may obtain some restitution. While there is no
doubt that such procedures are needed, their effectiveness has often not
lived up to the expectations of the proponents of such measures.5 9 The
reason for this failure stems not only from a widespread aversion on
the part of the public to getting involved in legal actions, but also arises
from the fact that the individual consumer's loss is often of such a
relatively minor value that legal action is not warranted. 6°
There is another approach to the problem of protecting the consumer-the use of criminal penalties. Enforcement of criminal statutes
against those who prey on the unwary by false or fraudulent schemes has
a number of advantages as compared to the use of civil actions.
First, the enforcement of criminal sanctions is a state action, thus
alleviating the consumer's dread of instigating and becoming involved in
the legal process. As previously noted, state action also has advantages
in relation to legal ramifications, especially in the area of contracts.
Secondly, the state is able to pursue those who make large profits by
short-changing many people out of small amounts. In other words the cost
of legal actions would be borne by the victimizer rather than the victim.
Thirdly, the notoriety of criminal proceedings and harsh penalties for
convictions can bring unscrupulous dealings to a halt much more quickly
than civil suits that are often just figured as a cost of doing business.
The Ohio larceny by trick statute has been chosen as an example of
how existing criminal statutes may be utilized to effectuate consumer
protection. The statute has only recently been applied to the area of
consumer protection, but the potential for increased use is considerable.
JERRY A. DAVIS

5

7 Knauer, A Need Fulfilled, I Loy. CONSUMER PRoTEcTIoN J. 3 (1972).

58 THE CouNcu. OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES, 23

(1970).
59 See REPORT No. 102 at 1.

60 Note, New York City's Alternative to the Consumer Class Action: The Government
as Robin Hood, 9 HAav. J. LEGIS. 301, 302 (1971-72).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/11

10

